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California Environmental Quality Act Lawsuits and 
California’s Housing Crisis 
Jennifer Hernandez 
Summary 
The California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”)1 continues to play a 
vital role in assuring that our state and local agencies carefully evaluate, 
disclose, and avoid or reduce the potentially adverse environmental 
consequences of their actions.  In addition, CEQA ensures that agencies 
consider and respond to public and agency comments on these 
environmental issues, and accept the responsibility of disclosing when, even 
after mitigating adverse impacts, such actions would have significant 
unavoidable adverse impacts on the environment. 
However, in recent years most CEQA lawsuits filed in California seek to 
block infill housing and transit-oriented land use plans, as well as public 
service and infrastructure projects in existing California communities.  Most 
of the challenged projects are precisely the types of projects and plans that 
today’s environmental and climate policies seek to promote.  The most 
frequent targets of CEQA lawsuits typically are required to undergo a 
rigorous environmental analysis and public review process that takes 18 to 
36 months or longer.  This process involves an Environmental Impact Report 
and at least three rounds of public notice and comment before being 
eligible for approval by public votes of elected officials.  Projects without the 
ample economic resources required to pay all costs (including technical and 
legal experts) are never eligible for an approval, and thus cannot be sued 
under CEQA.  Even the types of infill projects most commonly sued under 
CEQA that are not ultimately sued must undergo three rounds of costly 
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administrative proceedings: (1) local agency staff, (2) appointed planning 
commissions, and (3) elected city councils or boards of supervisors; 
planning commission and elected council or board approvals require 
majority votes from officials who are themselves elected and appointed 
based on majority votes from elections. CEQA lawsuits may only be filed 
against the projects that survive this multi-tiered review and approval 
gauntlet, and are actually approved.  There is no data available on the 
projects that lack the financial resources or the ability to overcome staff or 
political resistance to complete the entirety of this process, and are thus 
abandoned or downsized to avoid a CEQA lawsuit, or else, they enter into 
financial and other settlements to avoid a CEQA lawsuit. 
In 2015, I joined with two law firm colleagues and published In the 
Name of the Environment, which was the first comprehensive study of all 
lawsuits filed statewide under the California Environmental Quality Act.2  
This study reviewed all lawsuits filed over a three-year study period between 
2010 and 2012 (“First Dataset”).  Our study recommended a “mend, not end” 
approach to updating CEQA by modifying CEQA lawsuit rules to assure that 
enforcement of CEQA is again aimed at protecting the environment and 
public health.  We found that too often enforcement of CEQA is aimed at 
promoting the economic agendas of competitors and labor union leaders, or 
the discriminatory “Not In My Backyard” (NIMBY) agendas of those seeking 
to exclude housing, park, and school projects that would diversify 
communities by serving members of other races and economic classes.  We 
did not suggest any new CEQA exemptions or otherwise “gutting” CEQA or 
any other environmental, public health, or climate laws or regulations.  We 
made three specific recommendations for amending CEQA’s litigation rules: 
First, anonymous CEQA lawsuits by parties seeking to conceal their 
identity and their economic interests in the outcome of lawsuits must end. 
CEQA’s purpose is to protect the environment and human health, not 
advance economic agendas.  
Second, duplicative CEQA lawsuits allowing twenty or more lawsuit 
challenges for each agency approval for the same project or plan must end. 
Our communities have and must continue to evolve to meet new 
environmental, equity, and economic needs without the delays and costs 
created by serial lawsuits filed over many years (and even multiple decades) 
that repeatedly attack the same plans and projects. 
 
 2. Stephanie M. DeHerrera, David Friedman, Jennifer L. Hernandez, In 
the Name of the Environment: Litigation Abuse Under CEQA, HOLLAND & KNIGHT 
(August 2015), https://perma.cc/SV3V-F5L2.  To compile the original report 
as well as this sequel, we filed a Public Records Act request with the 
Attorney General’s office, which by statute is required to be served with 
copies of all CEQA lawsuits filed statewide.  See FN 4 in this first report for 
the lawsuit petition collection methodology. 
 




Finally, we supported expanding “remedy relief” beyond politically 
favored projects in “transactional” bills that addressed only one or two 
projects, and instead more broadly limiting the extraordinary judicial 
remedy of vacating project approvals if a CEQA study is deficient to  projects 
that could actually cause harm to the natural environment or public health. 
The presumptive remedy for deficient CEQA studies for other projects 
should be the required correction of CEQA study and imposition of 
additional feasible mitigation if warranted by the corrected study. 
Our study has garnered significant support, and some criticism.  No 
critics found any error in our data.  Several commenters asserted that there 
was not enough CEQA litigation to warrant making any conclusion about the 
need for modifying CEQA’s litigation rules.  Notwithstanding efforts to 
dismiss the need to update CEQA’s litigation rules, the political reality is 
that both before and after publication of our study, several “billionaire” 
projects, such as professional sports arenas and office headquarter 
complexes, have sought—and many have received—legislative relief from 
CEQA’s standard litigation framework.   
This article presents the next three-year tranche of CEQA lawsuit data 
(2013-2015) (“Second Dataset”).  The pattern of CEQA lawsuits has not 
changed, although an even higher percentage of CEQA lawsuit challenges 
were aimed at projects within existing communities.  The top lawsuit targets 
remain infill housing and local land use plans to increase housing densities 
and promote transit.  Given California’s extraordinary housing crisis3 and the 
shame inherent in having the nation’s highest poverty rate in one of the 
world’s most successful economies,4 the Second Dataset demonstrates even 
more clearly the need to update CEQA’s litigation rules to bring 
enforcement of CEQA into alignment with the state’s environmental, equity, 
and economic priorities. 
 
I. Introduction 
The First Dataset, the 2015 study I coauthored, demonstrated that 
CEQA lawsuits were most often aimed at infill housing (especially multi-
family apartments in urbanized areas), that more transit projects were 
challenged than roadway and highway projects combined, and that the most 
frequent “industrial” targets challenged were clean energy facilities like solar 
and wind projects.  As we discussed in our first report, these are the 
 
 3. LAO Housing Publications, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, 
https://perma.cc/6F87-7NXW. 
 4. David Friedman, Jennifer Hernandez, California's Social Priorities, 
HOLLAND & KNIGHT, Chapman University Press (2015), 
https://perma.cc/XKB7-4YK4. 
 




categories of projects—infill housing, transit, and renewable energy—
viewed as environmentally beneficial, and each is a critical element of 
California’s climate policies.5  The First Dataset helped break through 
political rhetoric about what was—and wasn’t—being targeted by CEQA 
lawsuits.  Most importantly, the data showed that the litigation practice that 
has evolved since CEQA’s 1970 enactment date was no longer focused on 
protecting forests and other natural lands, or fighting pollution sources like 
factories and freeways. Rather, CEQA has evolved into a legal tool most 
often used against the higher density urban housing, transit, and renewable 
energy projects, which are all critical components of California’s climate 
priorities and California’s ongoing efforts to remain a global leader on 
climate policy.   
The First Dataset also demonstrated the widespread abuse of CEQA 
lawsuits for nonenvironmental purposes.  State and regional environmental 
advocacy groups like the Sierra Club brought only thirteen precent of these 
lawsuits, while newlyminted, unincorporated groups with environmental-
sounding names filed nearly half to the most CEQA lawsuits. Unlike the 
federal environmental laws that allow for “citizen suit” enforcement like the 
Clean Water Act, Clean Air Act, and Endangered Species Act, CEQA lawsuits 
can be filed anonymously.  Additionally, lawsuits can be filed by parties 
attempting to advance an economic rather than environmental agenda, such 
as business competitors, labor unions, and “bounty hunter” lawyers seeking 
quick cash settlements, even if they have no real client.   
This article compiles and analyzes the next three years of statewide 
CEQA lawsuits, which extend into California’s post-recession economic 
recovery period between 2013-2015.  We repeated our original study 
methodology, but also sorted the data into regional subsets to better 
understand how CEQA lawsuit patterns differ by region.  We also mapped 
CEQA lawsuit challenges in the six-county Los Angeles region, which is the 
state’s most populous and most CEQA litigious region.   
This article also provides more detail on CEQA lawsuits challenging 
projects to build more housing, given the severity of California’s housing 
crisis.  Nonpartisan agencies6 and outside experts7 have attributed this crisis 
to about three decades of severe underproduction of new housing, 
especially in the coastal employment centers of the Bay Area and Southern 
California.  The housing crisis has produced a cascading sequence of 
 
 5. See, e.g., California Air Resource Board Scoping Plans for achieving 
greenhouse gas reduction targets, available here: AB 32 Scoping Plan, 
CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD (July 14, 2017), https://perma.cc/B9TH-9R6Y.   
 6. LAO, supra note 2. 
 7. Jan Mischke, Shannon Peloquin, Daniel Weisfield, Jonathan 
Woetzel, Closing California's Housing Gap, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Oct. 2016), 
https://perma.cc/QG7Q-U74E. 
 




adverse consequences to working Californians.  These consequences include 
the highest poverty rate in the nation when housing costs are taken into 
account, extreme commutes of more than three hours per day, billions of 
dollars in lost economic productivity, and adverse personal and public 
health outcomes including homelessness (more than 40,000 in Los Angeles 
alone).  These extreme commutes, along with a poorly conceived policy to 
discourage automobile use by intentionally increasing road congestion on 
highways, has resulted in adverse environmental outcomes.  Despite the 
most stringent clean car and clean fuel mandates in the nation, California’s 
annual air pollution from vehicles actually increased for the first time since 
such data was collected as drivers face ever longer—in distance and time—
commutes.8  
The key conclusion from this Second Dataset is that CEQA lawsuit 
abuse is worsening California’s housing crisis, increasing air pollution, 
increasing the global emissions of greenhouse gas that the state has vowed 
to reduce, and perpetuating and protecting segregation patterns by class 
and race.  Given the social and political values of Sacramento’s elected 
officials, I have concluded that if these CEQA practices were not pursued by 
powerful Sacramento special interests “in the name of the environment,” 
they would have been roundly condemned - and ended - many years ago. 
In short, the need to update CEQA litigation rules and end lawsuit 
abuse is stronger than ever. 
 
II. CEQA Litigation by the Numbers (2013-2015): After the Great 
 Recession, Even More Lawsuits Target Projects in  Existing 
 Communities, Especially Housing. 
Our First Dataset9 captured the end of the Great Recession, when 
California’s housing market collapsed. During this time, the federal 
government was issuing substantial grant funding for “shovel ready” public 
infrastructure (like the California High Speed Rail Project) and green energy 
upgrades (ranging from LED lighting retrofits for K-12 schools to the 
construction of large new wind and solar power generation facilities) under 
the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.  CEQA lawsuits filed 
in the First Dataset were about evenly split (49%/51%) between lawsuits 
targeting public agency projects for which there were no private applicants 
or “business” sponsor and lawsuits challenging housing or office buildings 
or other private sector projects sponsored by applicants needing public 
agency approvals or public funding. 
 
 8. Melanie Curry, Report: CA Emissions Shrinking—Except for Transportation, 
STREETS BLOG CAL (Aug. 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/8434-CUP6. 
 9. DeHerrera, Friedman, & Hernandez, supra note 4. 
 





A. Fifty-Nine Percent of CEQA Lawsuits Target Housing, 
 Public Service/Infrastructure Projects, and Agency 
 Plans/Regulations. 
In the Second Dataset, as shown in Figure 1, the return of private 
capital to the market after the recession bumped up the number of private 
applicants seeking government approvals, and the relative share of CEQA 
lawsuits targeting private sector projects jumped from 51% to 58%.  As was 
true for the First Dataset, the top three categories of lawsuit challenges were 
housing projects, followed by agency plans and regulations (most of which 
are local agency plans to increase housing or improve and diversify 
transportation infrastructure).  Rounding off the top three CEQA lawsuit 
targets were public service and infrastructure construction projects, most of 
which were located within and served existing communities.  In the First 
Dataset, these three categories of projects comprised 53% of all CEQA 
lawsuit targets.  In the Second Dataset, these project categories accounted 
for 57% of all CEQA lawsuit targets. 
 
Figure 1: Residential, Public Service & Infrastructure Projects, and 





























B. Most CEQA Lawsuits Target Projects in Urban 
 Population Centers, Not Rural or Remote Natural 
 Preserve Areas.   
Although CEQA lawsuit anecdotes and political rhetoric often focus on 
protecting natural lands and wilderness areas, in the First Dataset 55% of 
these lawsuits were filed in the San Francisco and Los Angeles regions, and 
only 22% of CEQA lawsuits were filed in the combined regions of the 
Mojave, Sierras, Central Coast, Sacramento, and Northern California (all 
counties north of San Francisco and Sacramento).  In the Second Dataset, 
the pattern of CEQA lawsuits as a tool used primarily in existing urban 
population centers increased. The Bay Area and Los Angeles region 
increased from 55% to 58% of the state’s total volumes of CEQA lawsuits.   
Los Angeles had more than twice as many CEQA lawsuits as the next most 
litigious region, San Francisco.  All 9 regions had some CEQA lawsuits, but 
the regions with more natural wilderness areas had the fewest CEQA 
lawsuits: fewer than 10 lawsuits were filed in the Mojave and Sierras, and 
only 22 CEQA lawsuits  were filed in all counties north of Sacramento. 
 

















C. The Vast Majority of CEQA Lawsuits Target Infill 
 Projects in Existing Communities, not Greenfield 
 Projects on Undeveloped Lands.   
In the First Dataset, about 80% of the CEQA lawsuits challenging 
projects that involved physical construction were located within the existing 
development patterns of existing communities, which is a definition of 
“infill” used by the state agency responsible for CEQA’s statewide regulatory 
“Guidelines,” the Governor’s Office of Planning & Research.10  Infill locations 
either fell within existing city boundaries, or within unincorporated county 
areas already surrounded by development, such as San Lorenzo in Alameda 
County and Marina Del Rey in Los Angeles County.  Unincorporated county 
areas at the fringe of existing cities or the edge of unincorporated county 
communities, even if adjacent to existing development, were tallied as 
“greenfield” projects, as were projects in agricultural and other undeveloped 
areas.  In the First Dataset, only 20% of CEQA lawsuits filed statewide 
challenged projects in Greenfields. 
In the Second Dataset, the percentage of CEQA lawsuits aimed at infill 
projects jumped 7%, from 80% to 87% of the CEQA lawsuits challenging 
construction projects.  Projects targeted in Greenfields fell to 12% of CEQA 
lawsuits filed statewide.   
 



















 10. Governor’s Office of Planning and Research, Infill Development, 
CA.GOV, https://perma.cc/3G99-YTGX.  
 





As part of the regional sorting methodology applied to our Second 
Dataset, this statewide tally hid more startling statistics: within the 9 
counties of the San Francisco Bay Area, for example, 100% of all CEQA 
lawsuits were filed against projects in infill locations.  Even within the 
Central Valley regions, most often criticized for allowing “sprawl” 
development, more than 70% of all challenged projects were in infill 
locations.  
 
D. Infill Housing Remains Top Target of CEQA Lawsuits. 
New housing projects were the most frequent target of CEQA lawsuits 
for which there was a private sector applicant in both the First Dataset and 
Second Dataset. However, the percentage of CEQA lawsuits against new 
housing units actually increased—from 21% to 25%—in the Second Dataset, 
even as California’s housing shortage reached crisis dimensions.11  The 
percentage of CEQA lawsuits challenging higher density housing projects 
like apartments and condominiums also increased—from 45% to 49%—
while the percentage of CEQA lawsuits challenging single family homes (or 
second units such as “granny flat” additions to single family homes) 
dropped from 17% to 13%. In both Datasets, the majority of challenged 
housing projects statewide were higher density—structures containing 
multiple housing units like apartments and condominiums—and located in 
more urbanized areas in regions with higher population densities. 
 
Figure 4: Multi-Family Apartments and Condominium Projects Are 
Top Target of CEQA Lawsuits Challenging  
 
 11. Matt Levin, California’s Housing Crisis – It’s Even Worse Than You Think, 
MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 28, 2017), https://perma.cc/K49U-4P4P.  
 




The regional subset of CEQA lawsuit housing data in the state’s two 
most populous regions, the San Francisco Bay Area and the Los 
Angeles/Inland Empire/Orange County region, paints a vivid picture of how 
clearly CEQA housing lawsuits clash with current policies encouraging 
higher density urban development and increased transit utilization.   
 
Regional Dataset highlights include: 
1. One Hundred Percent of Bay Area CEQA Housing 
 Lawsuits and 98% of the Los Angeles Region’s CEQA 
 Housing Lawsuits Target Infill Housing in Existing 
 Communities.   
Infill housing was far more likely to be targeted by CEQA lawsuits in all 
coastal regions of the state.  One hundred percent of challenged housing 
projects in the San Francisco region were in infill locations, and 98% of San 
Diego’s challenged housing, 82% of Northern California’s challenged 
housing projects, and 72% of the Central Coast region’s challenged housing 
projects were infill.  Even in the rural expanse of Northern California, which 
runs from the coastline to the Nevada border and includes vast open spaces 
and low population densities, 82% of challenged housing projects were 
infill—and in the Sierra Foothills 100% of challenged housing projects were 
infill.  Only in the San Joaquin Valley—which has a booming rate of housing 
production filled by displaced Bay Area families forced to “drive until they 
qualify” for affordable rents or home prices, and then endure daily 
commutes of three hours or longer—were the primary targets of CEQA 
housing lawsuits in greenfield rather than infill locations.  The two regions 
with the most CEQA lawsuits, Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay Area, 
also top state and national charts on high housing prices, high homeless 
populations, housing supply shortfalls, and unaffordable housing costs that 
drive poverty.   
2. Los Angeles Region Hit with Far More CEQA Housing 
 Lawsuits Than Any Other Region.   
In Los Angeles, 33% of CEQA lawsuits target housing projects, far 
greater than the 24% of CEQA housing lawsuits filed statewide.  In the 
Second Dataset, 13,946 housing units and a 200-bed homeless shelter were 
targeted by CEQA lawsuits in the Los Angeles region during the three-year 
study period.  In the state’s other major population centers, only 25% of 
CEQA lawsuits challenged housing projects in the San Diego region, 22% in 
the Bay Area region, and 16% in Sacramento.  CEQA lawsuits targeting 
housing in more rural areas were much less likely, except in the Central 
Coast counties of Santa Cruz, Monterey, San Louis Obispo, and Santa 
Barbara where housing challenges comprised 33% of all CEQA lawsuits. 
 




3. Transit-Oriented Urban Housing – Apartments and 
 Condos – Are Top Target of CEQA Housing Lawsuits  in 
LA Region. 
Under one of the state’s most important climate laws, Senate Bill 
375,12 regional transit agencies are required to identify parts of the region 
best served by public transit and adopt plans to encourage higher density 
housing (like multi-story apartment and condominium complexes) to help 
create riders for transit systems and discourage private automobile use.  The 
least costly—and most common—of these higher density, transit-oriented 
housing projects are built with wood frames in a mid-rise range of four to six 
stories.  The costliest—and least common—of these projects are high rise 
towers, required to be constructed from steel and concrete instead of wood 
frames.  Most of these are rental apartments instead of purchased 
condominiums, and some include some ground floor retail or other 
nonresidential uses.  Just over half (52%) of California’s existing housing 
units are single-family homes, another 9% are attached products like 
townhomes and duplexes, and 27% of existing housing units are low and 
mid-rise apartments or condominiums. Only 1% of Californians live in high 
rise towers, which are by far the most expensive to construct, rent or buy.13  
Notwithstanding the state’s adopted climate and environmental laws and 
policies to promote higher density transit oriented housing, this form of 
housing remains the top target of CEQA lawsuits.   
We studied the Los Angeles region—the five counties and 191 cities 
falling within the jurisdiction of the Southern California Association of 
Governments (SCAG)  regional transit agency—to better understand the use 
of CEQA against housing projects.  With SCAG’s assistance, we mapped the 
location of each challenged housing project, as well as the project’s 
approved number of housing units.   
In Figure 5, we first depict this information against the backdrop of the 
region’s best transit locations (around rail stations or in High Quality Transit 
Corridors (HQTC) with frequent commute hour bus service).  70% of the 
challenged housing units—10,188 housing units—were located within the 
transit priority areas and high-quality transit corridors where the state’s 





 12.  S.B. 375 of 2007-08, Stats. 2008, ch. 728, at 85.   
 13. Nathaniel Decker, Carol Galante, Karen Chapple & Amy Martin, Right 
Type, Right Place: Assessing the Environmental and Economic Impacts of Infill Residential 
Development Through 2030, Mar. 7 2017, https://perma.cc/96RY-ECW7. 
 




Figure 5: 70% of LA Region’s CEQA Lawsuits Target Transit 





















Another inconvenient truth is that LA CEQA housing lawsuits 
disproportionately target new housing in whiter, wealthier, healthier 
communities.  Some of the political support for protecting the CEQA 
litigation status quo come from environmental justice advocates who extoll 
CEQA lawsuits as a tool for protecting poor communities of color that 
already suffer from disparately high levels of pollution.  In response to 
environmental justice concerns, the Legislature directed California 
Environmental Protection Agency (Cal EPA) to map environmentally 
disadvantaged communities.14  Cal EPA prepared these maps based on 
metrics that include higher poverty and unemployment rates, lower 
educational attainment levels, higher populations of non-English speakers, 
higher rates of asthma and other health conditions associated with 
pollution, and more nearby sources of pollution such as freeways and 
contaminated factories.15  The Second Dataset makes clear that, in fact, 
CEQA lawsuits are most often filed to challenge projects in whiter, wealthier 
healthier communities.  As shown in Figure 6, 78% of challenged housing 
units were located outside the boundaries of these mapped disadvantaged 
communities. 
 
 14.  Stats. 2012, ch. 830.   
 15.  S.B. 535, Disadvantaged Communities, OEHHA, (Apr. 2017),  
https://oehha.ca.gov/calenviroscreen/sb535.   
 




Figure 6: 78% of Challenged Housing Units Located in Whiter, 






















The disparate use of CEQA lawsuits in whiter, wealthier, healthier 
communities extends beyond housing to other categories of CEQA lawsuits, 
such as lawsuits challenging transit improvements, school and park 
renovations, local land use plans, and upgraded infrastructure.  Figure 7 
includes the housing project lawsuit targets, and depicts in black dots the 
location of other types of projects targeted by CEQA lawsuits.  Less than 2% 
of lawsuits were outside the developed “urbanized areas” of the region, and 
most CEQA lawsuits are filed in West LA and in pockets of wealthier 


















Figure 7: More CEQA Lawsuits Challenge Projects in Wealthier 






















III. CEQA Lawsuits and Equity: Disproportionate Use of CEQA to 
 Target Apartments and Condos Perpetuates Land Use 
 Segregation by Race and Class. 
California has a severe housing shortage, and the housing that is 
available is unaffordable to most California families.  One study completed 
in 2016 by former State Senator Don Perata on behalf of the Infill Builders 
Federation compared the price of purchasing a home in traditionally less 
expensive cities in the Bay Area and Los Angeles to the average incomes of 
traditionally middle class workers like teachers, police and firefighters, retail 
clerks, UPS delivery drivers, postal workers, truck drivers, and nurses.16  At 
the time of the survey, homes in the San Gabriel Valley in Los Angeles had 
an average housing price of $611,000.  A 20% down payment and other one-
time expenses required savings of $140,530, and resulted in a mortgage 
payment of $3,150.  The mortgage payment alone was more than 80% of the 
total after tax income of teachers, police and firefighters and truck drivers 
 
 16. ”So You Think You Can Afford A Home in California?”, Personal 
Correspondence, Senate Pro Tem Emeritus Don Perata to Jennifer 
Hernandez, (May 2017) (on file with author). 
 




and was nearly twice the take home pay of retail clerks.17  The best paid of 
these middle wage job earners, nurses and UPS delivery drivers, needed to 
spend more than 70% of their take-home pay on their monthly mortgage.18  
The Perata study confirmed that full-time workers at what were once good 
jobs simply cannot afford housing in many areas of Los Angeles and San 
Francisco.19 
CEQA is one of the well-recognized culprits in California’s housing 
supply and affordability crisis.20  As UC Berkeley Economics Professor Enrico 
Moretti, an advocate for increasing density and productivity in urban 
regions, recently reported in the New York Times:  
 
Look at Silicon Valley.  It has some of the most productive labor 
in the nation, and some of the highest-paying jobs, but 
remarkably low density because of land-use regulations. . . . 
Building anything taller than three stories, even on empty lots 
next to a train station, draws protests from homeowners. 
 
And once a project is approved, it faces an endless series of 
appeals and lawsuits that can add years of delay.  Appeals are 
remarkably easy and affordable to file and can be done 
anonymously.  This basically gives every neighbor a veto over 
every new project, regardless of how desirable the project might 
be.  It’s as if Blackberry had veto power over whether Apple 
should be allowed to sell a new iPhone. 
 
To make things worse, well-intentioned regulations are often 
used by neighborhood groups to further delay projects.  The 
California Environmental Quality Act, for example, was written to 
protect green areas from pollution and degradation . . . Its main 
effect today is making urban housing more expensive.  It has 
added millions of dollars of extra costs to a sorely needed high-
rise on an empty parking lot on Market Street in downtown San 
Francisco. 
 
The Bay Area’s hills, beaches and parks are part of the area’s 
attractions, but there is enough underused land within its urban 
 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti, How Local Housing Regulations 
Smother the U.S. Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/W7C6-
HKC3]. 
 




core that the number of housing units could be greatly increased 
without any harm to those natural amenities.21 
 
Understanding why CEQA is such a problem weaves together two 
stories: a short history on how the existing land use patterns were set 
decades ago, and the strong legal bias against change embedded in CEQA. 
 
A. Much of California’s Existing Urban Land Use Patterns,
 the “Setting” Against Which Environmental  Impacts Are 
 Measured and Must Be “Mitigated” Under CEQA, Exist 
 As A Result of Historic Race and Class Segregation.   
California communities, like many other communities throughout the 
country, have a long history of resisting higher density apartments that are 
affordable to workers earning lower wages—especially workers from minority 
groups such as African Americans, Latinos, and Asians.  Former President 
Obama cited this history, and particularly the expansive use of land use and 
zoning laws, in a report confirming that racial and economic class 
segregation had actually increased rather than decreased in recent years.22  
A recent publication by author Richard Rothstein presents a 
remarkably thorough history of how zoning and land use laws were designed 
to promote discrimination against African Americans and other 
communities of color, recounting disturbing evidence of successful efforts 
by numerous Bay Area communities to racially segregate.23  By requiring 
large lot single family homes, imposing high development fees, and 
prohibiting or refusing to approve rental apartments or smaller, more 
affordable homes like duplexes, California communities became segregated 
by both race and class.24   
As dispassionately explained in Color of Law, during World War II, 
factories producing ships and other war material hired women and ethnic 
minorities to fill out their workforce.  In the Richmond shipyards in the Bay 
Area, the federal government helped support the dramatic growth of new 
workers near wartime factories by helping finance mortgages for single 
family homes.25  However, federal policy excluded African American workers 
 
 21. Hsieh & Moretii, supra note 20. 
 22. Housing Development Toolkit, THE WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 2016), 
https://perma.cc/3MAW-A8PN. 
 23. RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR 
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA (2017). 
 24. Id. at 2. 
 25.  Id. at 8–9. 
 




from both mortgage assistance and home ownership.26  Instead of 
accumulating family wealth by making payments on a mortgage, African-
American workers paid rent for much smaller rental apartments with far less 
parkland and other neighborhood amenities.  These differential housing 
programs—single-family home ownership for whites and rental rooming 
houses for African-Americans—were implemented in compliance with 
financing and land use agency rules designed to enforce segregation even in 
California communities that had no prior history of housing segregation.27  
After the war, Richmond’s factory workers remained racially integrated with 
the return of veterans to the workforce, with jobs paying wages that allowed 
all workers to move up the economic ladder.  When Ford Motor Company 
decided it needed a larger new factory than its wartime Richmond facility, 
Ford decided to move about forty miles south to Milpitas in Santa Clara 
County, and the company offered job transfers for its Richmond workers.28  
White workers could trade their equity in Richmond homes to buy new 
homes in Milpitas and nearby Santa Clara county, and did so.   
African-American workers, however, were shut out of proximate 
housing near the new factory by the combination of newly applied 
discriminatory financing rules, which denied African Americans access to 
veterans loans and federally insured mortgages, and local “character-of-
community” land use zoning laws, which required larger lots and single-
family homes (and prohibiting apartments) that were unaffordable to 
Richmond’s African American community.  This was further compounded by 
a legacy of spending their salaries on rent rather than the wealth 
accumulation mortgage payments made by their white home owning 
coworkers.29    
Milpitas and Santa Clara county both used discriminatory large lot 
single family home zoning, as well as high development fees, to price out 
African-American families near the new Milpitas Ford factory.  Over time, 
Ford’s African-American workforce—now forced to commute more than 
eighty miles daily—decreased substantially, and was further tainted by 
reports of unreliability based on commute-related tardiness.  Meanwhile, 
Ford’s white workforce had moved on and up to the next level of home 
ownership, and any grandchild fortunate enough to have kept that modest 
three-bedroom ranch home in Milpitas purchased by a white wartime worker 
scored a financial grand slam given average home values of $909,900.30 
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Workers unable to afford housing due to official government actions 
that discriminated on the basis of wealth and race never took that first step 
into middle class stability and wealth accumulation.  Every three years, the 
Federal Reserve evaluates consumer wealth, and every year, the family 
wealth of homeowners has increased in relation to the family wealth of 
renters.31  The latest complete survey, which includes data from 2010-2013, 
showed that a homeowners’ net worth is 36 times greater than a renters’ net 
worth ($194,500 v. $5,400).32  With the latest surge in home prices, the 
prediction is that the 2014-2016 dataset due to be released later next year 
will show a wealth differential of 45 times.33   Homeowners have much more 
wealth available to deal with college tuition, temporary job loss, illnesses, 
and other family emergencies.  As noted in the Color of Law, notwithstanding 
civil rights reforms in the late 1960s: 
 
Seventy years ago, many working- and lower-middle-class African 
American families could have afforded suburban single-family 
homes that cost about $75,000 (in today’s currency) with no 
down payment.  Millions of whites did so.  . . . The Fair Housing 
Act of 1968 prohibited future discrimination, but it was not 
primarily discrimination (although this still contributed) that 
kept African Americans out of most white suburbs after the law 
was passed.  It was primarily unaffordability.  The right that was 
unconstitutionally denied to African Americans in the late 1940s 
cannot be restored by passing a Fair Housing law that tells their 
descendants they can now buy homes in the suburbs, if only they 
can afford it.  The advantage that FHA and VA loans gave the 
white lower-middle class in the 1940s and ‘50s has become 
permanent.34 
 
 Implementation of these civil rights reforms cannot be taken for 
granted, but require the dogged enforcement advocacy and litigation in each 
of the successive decades by civil rights advocacy groups such as the 
Greenlining Institute cofounded by John Gamboa,35 to assure that minority 
communities get fair access veterans loans, small business loans, insurance 
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guarantees, and similar middle-class wealth creation programs of the federal 
and state government.  In the forty years since the enactment of the Fair 
Housing Act, minority home ownership rates  and household wealth  had 
substantially improved, and the gap between minority and white families 
was shrinking.36  That is, until the Great Recession’s predatory lending 
practices, which disproportionately targeted minority communities to take 
out mortgages that could never be repaid, wiped out decades of progress 
and plunged a disproportionately high number of minority families into 
foreclosure and rental housing.37 
Our current urban “environment” continues to be dominated by single 
family homes in neighborhoods consisting of other single-family homes.  A 
recent UC Berkeley study concluded that 62% of California households are 
single family homes, and another 9% live in town homes or duplexes.38 
Changing single family home neighborhoods by adding more 
residents, more traffic, and more kids using schools and parks challenges 
decades-old housing patterns. Additionally, bringing people who cannot 
afford to purchase single family homes in what has become million-dollar 
neighborhoods due to housing shortage challenges these patterns rooted in 
race and class discrimination.  The core legal structure of CEQA, which 
measures “environmental” impacts against the existing setting, protects  the 
existing characteristics of those neighborhoods and thus perpetuates land 
use practices founded in race and class discrimination.  
It is noteworthy that CEQA was enacted in 1970, in the midst of the 
same era of civil rights advocacy and legal reforms.  CEQA was also among 
the first of the modern era of environmental laws, and pre-dated scores of 
later laws that established mandates for the environmental degradation that 
dominated headlines in the 1960s and 1970s—mandates requiring clean air 
and water, public access to the coastline, stewardship of public lands, and 
the management and cleanup of household and industrial wastes. CEQA’s 
much more generalized framework of disclosing and minimizing “harm” to 
the environment has never been integrated into the fabric of other 
environmental laws, and over the years has resulted in what Governor Jerry 
 
 36. John Gamboa, Forward Economic Summit Remarks (2017), COMMUNITY 
BUILDERS CALIFORNIA; see also Laura Gambia, Homeownership and the Wealth Gap, 
COMMUNITY BUILDERS CALIFORNIA, (May, 2016); see also Gillian White, The 
Recession’s Racial Slant, THE ATLANTIC, (June 24, 2015), https://perma.cc/DVD4-
W6AJ; see also Carlos Garriga et al., The Homeownership Experience of Minorities 
During the Great Recession, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW (First 
Quarter, 2017) at 139–68. 
 37.  Gillian B. White, The Recession’s Racial Slant, THE ATLANTIC (June 24, 
2015) https://perma.cc/VDY7-MHHB. 
 38.  Decker, Galante, Chapple & Amy Martin, supra note 13.  
 




Brown has called an “amoeba” of law that is constantly expanding and 
unpredictably evolving—and is now the tool of choice for resisting change 
that would accommodate more people in existing communities.  Meanwhile,  
CEQA’s status quo defenders focus on the anecdotal use of CEQA against 
traditional industrial and protecting open space lands, but ignore the far 
more dominant current uses of CEQA against urban housing projects, and 
the local infrastructure and service facilities required to serve the people 
who live in these areas.39  The Second Dataset, with its deeper examination 
of housing and regions, provides compelling evidence of CEQA litigation 
abuse to perpetuate racial segregation and economic injustice.   
Zoning and other legal obstacles to increasing the supply or cost of 
homes in existing California communities should be critically scrutinized 
and updated to address the housing crisis.  As demonstrated by the 
profligated use of CEQA lawsuits against infill housing in existing 
communities, CEQA has prominent placement on this list of legal culprits. 
 
B. CEQA’s Legal Structure is Biased Against Change, and 
 Thereby Perpetuate Historic Racial and Economic 
 Segregation Patterns. 
Racially and economically exclusionary zoning and land use regulatory 
patterns have created California’s “existing environment” as defined by 
CEQA.  “Impacts” to this existing environment—ranging from temporary 
construction noise, to changes in private views, to increases in the number 
of kids playing in a park, going to school or using a library—are all required 
to be avoided or reduced to a “less than significant level,” to “the extent 
feasible given the objectives of the project.”40  CEQA does not create clear 
criteria for any of these terms, nor does CEQA define what can be 
considered an “impact” to the environment.  Since CEQA was enacted in 
1970, judges have periodically creatively interpreted the law to discover new 
“environmental impacts,” like changes to private views,41 or temporary 
construction noise that complies with construction noise standards required 
by state and local laws,42  which then become mandatory  under CEQA even 
if never expressly enacted by the Legislature.  Agency regulators also 
routinely propose expansions to CEQA to include more “impacts” that 
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require study and mitigation,43 which in turn lead to greater compliance 
costs, and more CEQA lawsuits as the precise scope of CEQA’s expanded 
requirements are litigated over the next decade or longer. 
As we discussed in our first study, CEQA lawsuits provide a uniquely 
powerful legal tool to block, delay, or leverage economic and other agendas 
after a project is approved.  CEQA lawsuits can be filed by anyone 
(anonymously), pursuing any agenda (including perpetuating or expanding 
racial and economic segregation, gaining an advantage over a business 
competitor, or leveraging money or other economic concessions such as a 
labor agreement from a project sponsor), even if the project causes no harm 
to the environment or public health.  The most common remedy in CEQA 
lawsuits is for a court to vacate— reverse—agency approval of the challenge 
project pending a redo of the CEQA process.  Since CEQA now requires an 
evaluation of more than 100 topics and sub-topics, appellate courts have 
found CEQA compliance deficiencies—typically for one part of one study—
in nearly half of the CEQA reported appellate court decisions.44   
The majority of Californians—two-thirds statewide and even 70% in 
the notoriously NIMBY Bay Area—support building more housing in their 
communities.45  Californians recognize and want to help solve the state’s 
housing crisis, which has adversely affected adults, children, college 
students, renters, businesses large and small that rely on a stable and 
diverse workforce, and backbone community contributors like teachers, 
nurses and firefighters. However, CEQA lawsuits are uniquely anti-
Democratic, and uniquely vulnerable to being hijacked for racist and other 
discriminatory objectives, as well as pursued for economic gains, that would 
be abhorrent and unlawful if openly acknowledged.   
Housing can be built, and it is politically supported by majorities of 
existing residents, including those who are protective of the character, 
services, and property values in their community across the country. 
However, CEQA lawsuits provide California’s anti-housing holdouts—the 
political minority of as few as one anonymous party—with a uniquely 
effective litigation tool to simply say “no” to change.  By filing a CEQA 
lawsuit alleging that the agency approving the project has made a mistake in 
analyzing one or more of the nearly 100 impact issues that must be 
addressed after nearly 50 years of evolving regulatory and judicial 
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interpretations of CEQA, this political minority can slow projects or stop 
them all together.   
As noted in our first report, it is also very inexpensive to file a CEQA 
lawsuit, as courts demand only a few hundred dollars to accept a new 
lawsuit.  The outcome of CEQA lawsuits is extraordinarily unpredictable; a 
metastudy of many types of lawsuits against agencies shows that agencies 
win about 80% of such lawsuits, and the chaos that would result from a 
pattern of agency losses prompted Congress to demand that the Internal 
Revenue Service track lawsuit outcomes and clarify or amend regulations 
that resulted in lawsuit losses.46  In contrast, several studies of CEQA lawsuit 
outcomes show a very different pattern.  Agencies lose nearly half of CEQA 
lawsuits, and further, agencies lose even more than half of lawsuits 
challenging smaller projects for which the agency concluded would cause no 
“significant” impacts.47 
When a judge decides that an agency should have conducted its CEQA 
preapproval review process differently, even if the error is confined to 
whether the traffic flow at a single intersection was appropriately counted,48 
the most common CEQA judicial remedy is to “vacate” the project approval 
until more environmental analyses is completed.  This remedy can be 
applied even to partially constructed or even completed occupied homes.  In 
an infamous example in Los Angeles, for example, a judge vacated the City’s 
approval of a high-rise apartment project that was already occupied, and 
tenants had to be escorted out.  The City’s CEQA violation in that case was a 
court decision that disagreed that the City had appropriately enforced a 
CEQA mitigation measure requiring the “preservation” of a non-historic 
building façade as part of the new high rise apartment by allowing the 
common sense approach of allowing the façade to be temporarily 
dismantled, and then re-assembled and attached to the new high-rise, which 
was in fact done.49  This incident was described in our first report, and the 
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building remains vacant—more than 3 years later—pending the completion 
of more CEQA review.50   
Those who successfully sue under CEQA can seek recovery from the 
public agency or private applicant their attorneys’ fees as well as a 
multiplier, based on the theory that enforcing CEQA confers a benefit on the 
environment and thus the public.51  Those filing CEQA lawsuits 
anonymously, or even for openly extortionate purposes, are protected from 
becoming the target of CEQA lawsuits by California’s anti-SLAPP (strategic 
lawsuits against public participation) statute, and are entitled to treble 
damages if improperly targeted by a lawsuit.52   
Because of the uncertainty in CEQA’s requirements,53 the time (3 to 5 
years, with some examples extending to 9 and 10 years) required to 
complete the trial and appellate court proceedings, and the extreme 
consequences of an adverse judicial outcome that vacates project approvals, 
once a CEQA lawsuit is filed it becomes very difficult for a public or private 
project to access project financing (bank loans or equity investors) or grant 
funding.  To timely complete politically favored projects, the Legislature has 
passed “buddy bills” granting remedy reform to CEQA lawsuits involving 
billionaire sports stadiums, corporate headquarters, and the Legislature’s 
own office building.54  However, the Building Trades blockade on CEQA 
reforms that would reduce CEQA’s value as a leverage tool to secure Project 
Labor Agreements has left California’s housing crisis at the ongoing mercy 
of CEQA lawsuits.55 
The founder of one of the most prolific CEQA plaintiff law firms, Clem 
Shute, in recently accepting a lifetime achievement award from the 
environmental section of the California State Bar Association, endorsed the 
need for CEQA litigation reform: 
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Moving to the bad and ugly side of CEQA, projects with merit 
that serve valid public purposes and not be harmful to the 
environment can be killed just by the passage of the time it takes 
to litigate a CEQA case.   
 
In the same vein, often just filing a CEQA lawsuit is the 
equivalent of an injunction because lenders will not provide 
funding where there is pending litigation.  This is fundamentally 
unfair.  There is no need to show a high probability of success to 
secure an injunction and no application of a bond requirement 
to offset damage to the developer should he or she prevail.   
 
CEQA has also been misused by people whose move is not 
environmental protection but using the law as leverage for other 
purposes.  I have seen this happen where a party argues directly 
to argue lack of CEQA compliance or where a party funds an 
unrelated group to carry the fight.  These, in my opinion, go to 
the bad or ugly side of CEQA’s impact.56 
 
In short, the act of filing a lawsuit, with no showing of harm to people 
or the environment, and no showing of the likelihood of winning on the 
merits, should not be the equivalent of winning an immediate injunction 
against a project—a project that has often been shaped by more than two 
years of community input and approved by elected leaders—with neither a 
hearing nor a bond. 
This economic and legal model of CEQA lawsuits—concealing the 
identity of those filing and funding CEQA lawsuits, low lawsuit costs, nearly 
50% probability of winning, attorneys and bonus awards for successful 
challengers, and no material financial costs for unsuccessful litigants—has 
created a robust cottage industry for lawyers and consultants on both sides 
of CEQA lawsuits.  And because CEQA applies only to new projects that 
require government approval or funding, CEQA’s legal structure provides a 
fearsome shield against change.  CEQA lawsuits put a sword in any 
opponent of change, motivated by any reason, including but by no means 
limited to protecting housing patterns rooted in race and class 
discrimination.   
 
IV. CEQA Lawsuits and Traditional Environmental Values: The 
 Ongoing Fight Against Housing by “Slow/No Growth” 
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 Environmental Advocates. 
Although sometimes derisively referred to as “Not In My Backyard” 
(NIMBY) advocates, “slow growth” has historically been identified as a pro-
environmental agenda and is closely aligned with historic preservation 
advocates as well as “Save Open Space and Agricultural Resources” (SOAR) 
land use controls directly enacted by voters in numerous California 
communities.57  Efforts by slow growth communities to shut down housing 
production and population growth have been largely successful.  For 
example, Marin County, located immediately north of San Francisco, limited 
population growth to 2% between 2000 and 2010, even though the state as a 
whole grew by 10% and the counties immediately north of Marin grew at 
nearly triple the rate of Marin.  It is not coincidental that Marin also had the 
region’s oldest population, earning the top ranking in the number of 
residents aged 50 or older.58  Ventura County, another stronghold of no 
growth politics, had a healthier growth rate at 9%, but this was dwarfed by 
the non-coastal Riverside and San Bernadino counties that grew by 42% and 
19%, respectively.59  It is no coincidence that Marin County has also been 
targeted for violating federal fair housing laws enacted to combat racial 
segregation.60 
Only one Bay Area county accommodated its fair share of population 
growth: Contra Costa grew by 10.5%.61  Meanwhile, immediately outside the 
9-county Bay Area region, the Central Valley region’s San Joaquin County 
grew by 22%, while population growth immediately adjacent to the Bay Area 
region rose to 22%.62  Growth rates in more distant reaches of the Bay Area 
have anti-housing policies so severe that both counties actually lost 
population in the last census round (2000 to 2010) even though the housing 
supply crisis in both regions was already acute.  Numerous commenters 
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have observed that it is not possible to reconcile the climate priority of 
encouraging infill housing with anti-housing no-growth communities. 
However, these communities—like Ventura, Marin and San Francisco’s 
wealthiest old guard anti-housing neighborhoods—also produce stalwart 
environmental advocates and deep pocket donors for environmental and 
climate advocacy efforts, and it is at best awkward to challenge the anti-
housing sentiments of funders.  A new generation of progressive advocates 
is doing so, including state Senator Scott Weiner and YIMBY (Yes In My 
Backyard) California co-founders, Sonja Troust and Brian Hanlon.63   
Even California’s premier climate champion, former state Senator Fran 
Pavley, deferred to her NIMBY neighbors in failing to support 2016 
legislation to allow “granny flats” to be built in existing single-family 
homes.64  Since many single family homes were built when families were 
much larger, and homeowners tend to remain in their homes rather than 
move to smaller homes after their kids leave, these “accessory dwelling 
units” offer a virtually invisible method for a “win-win” outcome.  “Granny 
flats” create new, lower cost housing—and new income sources for 
homeowners.   Even this most modest of changes to existing neighborhoods 
has prompted CEQA lawsuits against individual units, and against local 
zoning regulations that allow such units to be constructed.65  The Color of Law 
is a remarkable new history of the abuse of presumptively “color-blind” laws 
and regulations, such as land use zoning, infrastructure, and workface labor, 
and how they were intended to—and in fact did—discriminate against 
African Americans in California and other states.66  Taking a page out of the 
Color of Law, to assure that wealthy enclaves of single family homes remain 
unblemished by the occasional college student or in-law moving into an 
existing home with the dignity and privacy afforded by a separate entry door, 
private bath and galley kitchen, some communities are imposing fees 
nearing $100,000 to convert an extra bedroom and bathroom into a studio 
apartment. Additionally, current building standards can cost another 
$100,000 or more in building retrofit, and even small “granny units” of less 
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than 700 square feet can cost $300,000 or more—assuming no CEQA lawsuit 
challenges are filed by neighbors.67 
The fight between traditional environmental advocates (i.e., older 
homeowners seeking to protect the character of their communities) and 
newer environmental advocates (i.e., younger workers unable to afford 
housing and deeply concerned about climate) has played out in two recent 
fights over the soul, and control, of local Sierra Club chapters.  In Seattle, 
which has produced far more housing than San Francisco despite occupying 
a smaller region, a group of primarily millennial environmental advocates 
nominated each other to leadership positions on the local Sierra Club 
chapter, and then elected themselves as the new generation of Sierra Club 
leadership.68  Overnight, the Sierra Club in Seattle was converted from a 
preservationist-first, anti-change hammer set to pound any local official 
tempted to vote for new housing into a pro-housing, pro-transit supporter of 
evolving mix of higher density urban neighborhoods with multiple ranges of 
housing prices and lower per capita greenhouse gas emissions.  The YIMBYs 
arrived, and with them, the Sierra Club’s endorsement of prolific new 
housing production in Seattle. 
The same tactics failed in two rounds of elections with the fierce old 
guard leaders of San Francisco’s Sierra Club chapter.  Although the national 
headquarters office is located downtown and has long hosted local Sierra 
Club meetings, the San Francisco chapter has resorted to meeting in the 
homes of old guard members to try to dissuade YIMBY members from 
participating in chapter activities, let alone seeking leadership positions.  
The old guard declined to even allow YIMBY advocates to be included on the 
ballot for local chapter leadership positions—a decision that was eventually 
reversed by the national Sierra Club after several rounds of appeals by 
YIMBY club members.  In San Francisco, unlike Seattle, the Sierra Club 
continues to fight new housing projects—and has never advocated for any 
new housing project—and woe to the ambitious politician in San Francisco 
who fails to earn the Sierra Club chapter’s endorsement.69 
For traditional environmentalists committed to preserving the 
character of their existing community (notwithstanding its probable origin in 
the race and class based zoning practices of the last century), the awkward 
truth is that fighting urban density undermines climate leadership.  As 
summarized in a recent Bay Area Sierra Club newsletter article, “How do you 
convert a NIMBY into a YIMBY?:” 
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Studies have established a clear correlation between urban 
density and reduced carbon emissions.  A 2014 report from the 
University of California, Berkeley . . . found that families living in 
denser urban cores had a carbon footprint that was half that of 
families living in suburbs. 
 
YIMBYs want more than just interconnected [smart growth] 
neighborhoods – they also want housing to be affordable.  Such 
policies can lead to tension with those residents—often older, 
whiter, and more affluent—who don’t want traffic, congestion, 
and other effects of urban density, such as shadows from high-
rise buildings.  The conflicts play out before zoning boards, city 
councils, and other public bodies where young YIMBYs turn out 
to support large housing projects.  The NIMBYs who oppose 
them are often progressive, environmentally minded individuals 
who believe in climate action and recognize that sprawl is 
unsustainable; they just want to preserve the look and feel of the 
neighborhoods they call home.70 
 
CEQA lawsuits are the perfect tool for the holdout NIMBY.  These 
NIMBYs are like the two individuals who disagreed with the majority vote in 
multiple Berkeley ballot initiatives to increase density near BART, and 
decided to file a CEQA lawsuit against a downtown apartment project with 
the desire to maintain enough room on BART for them to sit instead of 
stand.71  CEQA also proved to be the perfect tool for the trio who launched 
more than twenty lawsuits against the same redevelopment project in Playa 
Vista over a span of nearly thirty years,72 and for the environmentalist lawyer 
who halted granny units in all of Los Angeles.73  There is irony and tragedy in 
preserving this fealty to status quo of CEQA lawsuit rules in a state that 
prides itself on innovation, creativity, and creative (and profitable) 
disruptive technologies, products and services. 
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 The fact that NIMBY behavior also effectively discriminates against the 
minorities barred by law and then practice from many California 
communities is an uncomfortably racist reality only rarely acknowledged by 
environmental advocacy groups funded by NIMBYs.  As documented in a 
2014 University of Michigan study of 191 environmental non-profits, 74 
government environmental agencies, and 28 leading environmental grant 
making foundations, “The State of Diversity in Environmental 
Organizations,” were funded by environmental group supporters.  Despite 
increasing racial diversity in the United States, the racial composition in 
environmental organizations and agencies has not broken the 12% to 16% 
“green ceiling” that has been in place for decades.  Confidential interviews 
with environmental professionals and survey data highlight alienation and 
“unconscious bias” as factors hampering recruitment and retention of 
talented people of color.  Efforts to attract and retain talented people of 
color have been lackluster across the environmental movement.74  
 Bias begets blindness: NIMBY use of CEQA lawsuits against multi-
family infill housing to protect the “character of their community”—too often 
used as a code word for excluding “those people”—should have been 
roundly condemned by environmental advocates who routinely espouse a 
commitment to equity and environmental justice.  Instead, support for anti-
housing NIMBY-ism remains firmly rooted in the environmental activist 
world, prompting Professor Enrico Moretti to resign from his multi-decade 
membership in the Sierra Club: 
Thanks to aggressive lobbying by an odd coalition of Nimby 
homeowners and progressives – radical county supervisors, tenants’ 
unions, environmental groups – in places like San Francisco and 
Oakland, it takes years (and sometimes even decades), harsh political 
battles and arduous appeals to get a market-rate housing project 
approved. 
Some restrictions make sense: Nobody wants skyscrapers poking up 
among Victorian houses, and nobody wants to tear down historical 
buildings.  But many others don’t: There are scores of empty parking lots 
in San Francisco and Oakland that can’t be built on because of political 
opposition. 
Bay Area urban progressives, by fighting new housing in their 
neighborhoods, cause more sprawl on the rural fringes.  I’m a committed 
environmentalist, and it made me rethink the way I engage with such 
issues: For example, I was a member of the Sierra Club for more than a 
decade.  But because of all the unwise battles waged by the San 
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Francisco chapter against smart housing growth in the city, I quit to 
support other environmental groups.75 
 
V. CEQA Lawsuits and Climate Leadership: Why CEQA Lawsuits 
 and Agency Proposals to Expand CEQA Threaten California’s 
 Climate Leadership  and Perpetuate  Racial and Economic 
 Injustice. 
Climate change was not on anyone’s radar screen when CEQA was 
enacted in 1970.  Governor Brown and others have described climate change 
as an “existential” threat to the planet,76 which requires immediate and 
dramatic changes in how we power our homes and factories, how we travel 
every day, and how our entire economy functions.77  The status quo of 
CEQA’s litigation rules directly and indirectly undermines California’s 
climate leadership. 
 
A. Political Resiliency and Climate Change.   
 Climate change is important to Californians and our elected leaders.78  
However, the housing crisis, ranging from an explosion in the homeless 
population, to the unavailability of middle class housing affordable, to 
teachers and other middle-income workers, now consistently polls much 
higher than climate change as a priority for Californians—along with other 
immediate, pragmatic concerns that affect everyone daily, like health care, 
transportation and schools.79   
The Governor’s climate change regulators have proposed scores of 
measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help California achieve 
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its climate change objectives.  While increased transportation80 and energy 
costs of climate measures has been extensively documented,81 measures 
that substantially raise housing costs are less published (e.g., the fact that 
“net zero” homes cannot meet ten year cost effectiveness criteria required by 
statute, as recently confirmed by the California Energy Commission Building 
Standards division).82   
Overall, climate regulations already imposed or under consideration 
for adoption as part of the 2017 “Scoping Plan” to achieve California’s 
greenhouse gas reduction goals place a disproportionately high burden on 
those households that have had to move further inland, drive longer 
distances, live in climates requiring more air conditioning and heating, and 
rent or purchase housing made more costly by CalGreen’s new climate-
based building codes.  Even more astonishing, however, are climate agency 
proposals to actually expand CEQA—increasing both compliance costs and 
litigation risks—for all new projects, including desperately needed new 
housing.  
Increasing housing costs and expanding CEQA hit hardest at the same 
California households that have been priced out of urban housing markets.  
For example, the Office of Planning and Research (OPR) has proposed to 
expand CEQA to make driving one mile (even in an electric car) a new CEQA 
impact requiring “feasible” mitigation.83  OPR has also proposed to expand 
CEQA to make building one mile of new highway capacity (even to relieve 
congestion, or to build a carpool lane) a new CEQA impact.84  Both new 
impacts are proposed as part of a climate policy initiative of intentionally 
increasing traffic congestion to induce people to switch from cars to buses 
(or where available, to rail).85  OPR’s proposal to expand CEQA has in turn 
been endorsed by California’s lead climate agency, the California Air 
Resources Board (CARB), in its 2017 Scoping Plan proposal.86    
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Expanding CEQA as a global climate strategy with the intention of 
forcing families—and disproportionately minority households—that are 
already priced out of proximate housing, and already burdened by high 
housing costs and crushing commutes, will earn a future “Color of Law” 
dishonorable badge of bureaucratic shame when applied to the reality of 
hard working Californians who are forced to drive ever longer distances, for 
ever longer periods of time, to get to housing they can afford.  In fact, 
expanding CEQA to intentionally increase traffic congestion 
disproportionately hits those households without access to adequate 
housing the hardest: all Californians have to pay new gas taxes for road 
maintenance, and all have to pay higher gas prices as part of the cap and 
trade program, but only aspiring families wanting to purchase their first 
home or rent housing they can afford will bear the cost of an expanded and 
vague new “vehicle mile travelled” and “traffic inducement” mitigation 
mandate that applies only to newly approved plans and projects.   
CARB’s proposed 2017 Scoping Plan takes an even more expansive 
approach with CEQA, recommending that “all feasible” mitigation measures 
reducing greenhouse gas be required for all new projects and plans, with no 
direction as to how much is enough, or how much more economic burdens 
should be placed on new greenhouse gas reductions in relation to CEQA’s 
myriad other impacts and mitigation mandates for new housing,87 like 
school fees, inclusionary housing fees, and other fees that can add more 
than $100,000 to the cost of each housing unit (even small rental 
apartments).88  Like the OPR CEQA expansion proposal, the CARB CEQA 
expansion proposal places a disparate (and case-by-case, lawsuit-by-
lawsuit) new greenhouse gas reduction obligation on new housing, above 
and beyond the many greenhouse gas reduction mandates already imposed 
on new housing construction by regulations such as California’s extensive 
“green” building code, and housing-related climate mandates applicable to 
other sectors such as electricity generation, transportation, and waste 
management.89 
Groups studying the equity impacts of policies to increase urban 
density have consistently found that those being displaced earn lower 
incomes than those able to afford the limited numbers of shiny new 
apartments and condos being built in urban core job centers, and have 
identified census bureau data supporting their claim. Figure 8 shows the 
outward migration of African American families from core cities like San 
Francisco, Oakland, and San Jose to outlying suburbs like Santa Rosa, 
Fairfield and Antioch—and to even more communities in the San Joaquin 
Valley. 
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The housing crisis has already resulted in severe poverty rates, 
homelessness, and the diaspora of racial minorities to ever more distant 
locations.  To then use climate policy generally, and CEQA specifically, to 
charge a fee or otherwise require an unquantifiable level of “mitigation” for 
every mile travelled for those forced to “drive until they qualify” for housing 
they can rent or own clearly is precisely the type of disparate impact 
highlighted in decades of discriminatory government policies in Color of Law.   
Similarly, to intentionally increase traffic congestion as a climate 
strategy—which will inevitably result in greater tardiness for those workers 
forced to live farther away from jobs by the housing crisis—is to replicate 
the sin of the land use regulators in Milpitas and Santa Clara county faced 
with the socially unacceptable outcome of accepting a racially integrated 
change to the character of their community.  Whether in the name of climate 
or community character, minority commuters driving forty miles each way to 
the Ford factory in Milpitas increased segregation since a reliable and 
racially diverse workforce simply “can’t be counted on” to get to their jobs 
promptly.  Under this latest version of disparate impact government 
policies, many more workers (especially those with lower educational 
attainment levels) are likely to suffer from OPR’s strategy to use CEQA to 
intentionally increase road congestion, where the solution is less likely to be 
a whiter, more proximate workforce and more likely to be robotic workforce 
with fewer overall workers.  
 
While some climate advocates have focused on developing and 
rapidly deploying clean car technologies, OPR and seven other 
state agencies have proposed to increase their authority over 
local land use decisions, and impose urban growth boundaries 
 




(which have been proven to increase housing costs and limit 
supplies), charge development in urban areas an extra fee to pay 
for natural land conservation stewardship activities, and 
prioritize new development on the top target of CEQA lawsuits— 
high density, transit-oriented housing—at the same time they 
are expanding CEQA into the uncharted and litigious new 
territory of vehicle mile travelled and traffic inducement 
“impacts.”90 
 
Meanwhile, notwithstanding billions of dollars in new investments, 
ridership on public transit has dropped in all California regions,91 and the 
nation’s most authoritative transit access study continues to confirm that 
fewer than 10% of jobs can be accessed even in a 60-minute commute on 
public transit in any metropolitan region of California.92   
In a democracy that depends on majority votes, California’s climate 
policy must be politically resilient—and it cannot be blind to the race and 
class of those targeted with higher cost burdens, nor can it be blind to the 
hardships felt by the 40% of California’s working families living below or near 
the poverty line.  
 
B. Global Greenhouse Gas Consequences of Housing Crisis 
Leakage.  
California’s climate laws mandate dramatic reductions in greenhouse 
gas emissions (GHG) generated within the geographic boundaries of 
California.93  GHG emissions that occur outside California are not counted in 
California’s GHG emissions inventory, nor are these emissions required to 
be reduced.  These GHG emissions include emissions from manufacturing 
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smart phones, solar panels, computers, and cars bought and used by 
Californians.  Although California has created many “green jobs”—mostly for 
construction workers installing solar panels—there is also a steady exodus 
of workers and their families who move to other states.  A study by The 
Sacramento Bee of U.S. Census Bureau records found that every year from 2000 
to 2015, more people left California than moved in from other states.94  The 
Bee estimated that the net outward migration during that period was 800,000 
people.  In a 2017 poll, half of all respondents reported that they were 
considering moving out of California because of high housing costs.95   
The top destinations for these Californians are Texas, Arizona, Nevada, 
Washington, Oregon, and Colorado.  However, every time someone moves 
from California to any of these other states, global GHG emissions actually 
increase because per capita GHG emissions are much higher in each of 
these states, as shown in Figure 10.  For example, the per capita GHG 
emissions in Texas are nearly three times higher than California’s per capita 
GHG emissions.  California has worked very hard to reduce its GHG 
emissions and already achieved very significant decreases.  However, to 
reduce the next tranche of GHG emissions by the dramatic levels required by 
law, California’s climate leaders need to decide whether to embrace policies 
that recognize equity, civil rights, the political need for local resiliency and 
global effectiveness over time, or are we simply playing a shell game to drive 
ever more people (and their cars) out of California even if global GHG 
emissions actually increase?  
 
C. Building Housing Unaffordable to Middle Wage 
 Workers Exacerbates Segregation and Promotes 
 Political Instability, and Threatens California’s Climate 
 Leadership.   
The core housing priority informing current climate policies is to build 
smaller housing units in taller existing multi-family buildings.  State climate 
laws seek to reduce single family home construction.  Existing cities and 
areas long included in plans have also complied with California’s GHG 
reduction laws.  Even ignoring Fannie Mae’s data showing ongoing strong 
consumer preferences for single family homes, both for empty nest 
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households with seniors and for millennials,96 the archetypal housing 
produced favored by climate advocates is simply unaffordable to middle 
income earners.  In a recent report by UC Berkeley’s Terner Center for 
Housing Innovation and UC Berkeley School of Law, the authors assumed 
that the construction cost per square foot of building a 2,000 square foot 
single family home was generally equivalent to the cost of building an 800 
square foot low-rise apartment (generally six stories or less).  Thus, the 
apartment costs 2.5 times more to build compared to a single family home.97  
The construction costs for apartments in high rise buildings (steel and 
concrete structures) is about twice the cost of building mid-rise units.   
Middle income families can still afford (barely) to buy a $400,000 home 
with three bedrooms, two bathrooms, and a small yard in a distant suburb 
located north or east of coastal job centers.  Middle income families cannot 
afford, and cannot comfortably fit, in an 800 square foot urban apartment 
with monthly rents of $3500 to $4000.  
Consistent with climate policy priorities, the authors of the study 
recommend dramatically increasing the density of existing communities.98   
To control costs, the authors recommend cheaper, smaller housing types 
(duplexes, quadplexes, townhomes, and mid-rise apartments), and 
development in existing communities for new units.99  The authors 
acknowledge that their preferred “Target Scenario” would “not only entail the 
new construction of 1.9 million units, but also the demolition and 
redevelopment of tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands of units.”100  
These “demolished units would consist disproportionately of those paying 
“below the median rents for their neighborhoods.”101  The authors then 
recommend public policy and funding solutions for displaced lower income 
households. 
Displacing hundreds of thousands of existing residents paying “below 
median” rents falls squarely on the spectrum of other policy proposals by 
academics and agencies that will disproportionately harm low-income 
residents, and communities of color.  Like the shameful examples described 
in “The Color of Law,” like targeting low income minority communities for 
large-scale demolition in redevelopment schemes that never seemed to 
have enough funding to help those it hurt.  Another example is promoting 
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community safety by targeting low income communities of color for 
demolition to make way for interstate highways in cities.  The bottom line of 
this “climate” policy is displacement of those barely hanging on to housing 
in the midst of an unprecedented housing and poverty crisis in California.   
 














To date, no state agency has acknowledged the global GHG impacts 
from people moving out of state due to California’s housing crisis, or 
acknowledged that an effective climate policy should keep Californians at 
home and at work in housing they can afford.  Instead, California’s CEQA 
regulators—and a coalition of seven other state agencies—have threatened 
to intervene in local land use decisions with policies that increase housing 
costs and target existing urban residents with demolition and displacement.  
These policies do nothing to increase the housing supply, reduce 
astronomical housing costs, or overcome the most significant legal barrier 
to the timely completion of less expensive housing in locally and regionally 
approved plans that have already been endorsed by state climate regulators 
as meeting California’s climate mandates.   Updating CEQA’s lawsuit rules 
as suggested herein would in fact increase the timely production of the 
types of housing favored by climate policies, and most frequently sued 
under CEQA.  As discussed below, however, these common sense CEQA 
lawsuit rule reforms run afoul of one of Sacramento’s most powerful special 
interests—the union leaders (and their CEQA law firms) comprising the 
Building Trades Council.  
Functioning infrastructure, quality public services, and more housing 
all work in tandem along with the land use plans and ordinances that allow 
for thoughtful integration of these related community needs.  When it 
becomes the norm to have dysfunctional transportation systems and 
deteriorating parks and libraries, then community resistance to new housing 
gets even stronger.  The environmental and climate policy objectives of 
encouraging higher density, transit-oriented communities become even less 
likely to survive the local political approval process.  CEQA lawsuits occur 
 




only housing projects that have managed to run this community political 
gauntlet successfully, and actually get approved.  There is no reliable metric 
for assessing the number of housing projects and housing units that lay on 
the cutting room floor from projects that never make it to or through the 
local approval process.  Similarly, there is no metric for projects that get 
substantially downsized as part of the approval process, based on CEQA 
litigation risks or threats. 
 
VI. Why do CEQA Lawsuit Rules Still Allow Anonymous Lawsuits 
 to be Filed to Advance NonEnvironmental Agendas Against 
 Environmentally Benign or Beneficial Projects Like Housing?   
A housing crisis has driven California to have the highest poverty rate 
of any state in the nation (more than 20%, or nearly 9 million people, 
according to the US Census)102 and that leaves 40% of Californians unable to 
regularly meet basic household expenses (forced to choose between 
medical care, housing costs, and other routine expenses – and one paycheck 
or injury/illness away from potential homelessness, according to United Way 
of California).103 Combined with 6 years of data demonstrating that infill 
housing is the top target of CEQA lawsuits statewide, why has one of the 
most accomplished politicians of his generation and a “progressive” 
Democratic party supermajority thrown in the towel on ending CEQA 
litigation abuse?   
Governor Jerry Brown—the same man who was so frustrated by CEQA 
during his term as Oakland Mayor that he penned an amicus brief to the 
California Supreme Court which unsuccessfully sought to overturn an 
appellate court decision that elevated private views from private homes as 
an “impact” deserving of CEQA protection from the horror of viewing four 
story town homes104—promised to reform CEQA, calling it the “Lord’s Work.”  
By his fourth term, he had given up.  In an interview with UCLA’s Blueprint 
magazine, he was blunt in explaining why he couldn’t reform CEQA, stating 
“the unions won’t let you because they use it as a hammer to get project 
labor agreements.”105   
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Governor’s Brown’s blunt conclusion that certain construction 
unions—and not the environmental advocacy groups more frequently 
associated with environmental laws like CEQA—have blocked CEQA reform 
was demonstrated in the following two legislative CEQA reform efforts in 
2016 and 2017. 
 
A. Protect Anonymity - Oppose Transparency. 
To try to advance one of the litigation rule changes that would end 
CEQA abuse, several experienced CEQA lawyers representing both public 
agencies and private applicants first requested the California Judicial 
Council—which establishes court rules such as whether parties filing 
lawsuits need to disclose their identity—to amend the CEQA court rules 
that require disclosure at the front end of CEQA lawsuits during filing.106  The 
Rules of Court already require this disclosure at the back end.107  The 
disclosure is required if the party wins the lawsuit and wants to be paid 
attorney fees and a bonus from taxpayers, if the lawsuit is against a public 
agency, and if the lawsuit challenges a permit issued to a private party.  The 
Rules of Court also already require those filing “friend of court” briefs when 
they are not a party to the lawsuit to disclose their identity and interests.108  
The Judicial Council, most of whom are appointed by the Legislature, balked 
at our request.  The rationale was that requiring disclosure of who sues 
under CEQA was a policy decision to be made by the Legislature.109  Working 
with several senior CEQA lawyers who represent both public agencies and 
private sector applicants, some members of the legal team who filed the 
Judicial Council request then drafted legislation that would help end 
manipulative abuse of overburdened superior judges by requiring those 
filing CEQA lawsuits to disclose their identity and interest.  Judges have 
been directed by the California Supreme Court to interpret CEQA 
expansively to protect the environment, but are under no such direction to 
interpret CEQA expansively to advance the economic interests of 
anonymous litigants.  
One of these bills, Assembly Bill 2026 was then considered in a policy 
committee hearing in the Legislature.  The chief lobbyist for the Building 
Trades (which primarily represents mechanical trade locals like mechanical, 
electrical and pipefitters), strongly opposed requiring disclosure in CEQA 
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lawsuits, saying this change would “dismantle” CEQA.110  All major 
environmental groups that routinely lobby in Sacramento—like the Sierra 
Club and California League of Conservation Voters—piled on, inexplicably 
opposing simple disclosure and transparency by those filing CEQA lawsuits.  
The hearing was particularly ironic in that these identical labor and 
environmental lobbyists had just urged expanding the transparency 
requirements of the Coastal Commission—but irony was in short supply in 
this tense face-off between political integrity and political patronage.  
Patronage won: while the Democratic chair chided the labor lobbyist by 
noting that was hard to see why transparency would “dismantle” CEQA, the 
legislative amendment was defeated in a party line vote.111 
Others have documented union use of CEQA lawsuits, but such 
information is hard to come by—and hard to readily verify using online 
resources—since unions rarely sue in their own name and instead make use 
of the anonymous CEQA lawsuit abuse route.112 
 
B. Protect Duplicative Lawsuits: Allow Anyone to Litigate 
 Every Approval, Every Time—Unless Projects Pay 
 Prevailing Wages and Use Apprenticeship Program 
 Workers.   
California has an elaborate web of laws aimed at requiring every 
community to adopt land use plans that balance economic growth, 
environmental protection, and equity (including affordable housing for low 
income Californians).  None of these plans can be approved without first 
completing the CEQA process, most often an Environmental Impact Report 
(EIR).  Developing these plans and the EIR generally takes 1-3 years, costs 
hundreds of thousands and sometimes millions of dollars, involves an 
extensive community outreach process, and advisory vote by appointed 
planning commissioners, and a final vote by an elected City Council or 
Board of Supervisors.  These plans identify where future housing and 
transportation improvements are supposed to be located, as well as parks, 
employers, schools and other land uses.  The plans also identify how much 
housing should go where, often with a range that allows for future 
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adjustments within the range.  These plans can then be targeted by CEQA 
lawsuits, and invalidated if a judge finds that the EIR was deficient.   
Even if the EIR is not flawed, and the plan takes effect without a 
lawsuit or after a lawsuit, most new housing projects will need to go through 
the CEQA process all over again, and the project can be sued again, even if 
it complies with the plan.  For big projects that require multiple approvals 
over time for each phase, more CEQA is generally required for each phase, 
and projects can be sued again for each phase.  For some projects, these 
duplicative rounds of CEQA lawsuits sometimes span twenty years, and 
twenty lawsuits, or more.   
The 2016-2017 Legislative sessions each took a bank shot approach to 
ending duplicative lawsuits.  Here’s the bank shot: CEQA already includes a 
statutory exemption for projects which an agency is required to approve as 
long as the project satisfies all approval eligibility requirements.  For 
example, if a homeowner wants to replace windows with energy-efficient 
double-paned windows, some cities require the homeowner to obtain a 
“building permit.”  The city does not have the discretion to deny this type of 
permit as long as the homeowner meets permit approval criteria (e.g., the 
window is not too close to the next door neighbor).113  Local agency 
approvals for apartments and condominium projects are more complicated, 
and cities have generally retained the discretion to add conditions of 
approval or exercise their judgement to downsize or even disapprove a 
project—and CEQA applies to these “discretionary” permit decisions.   
In 2016, when the housing crisis was reaching its first political 
crescendo  in Sacramento and the Governor declared that a state funding 
solution for housing was infeasible —we could not “spend our way out of 
the crisis”114—the Governor attempted to squeeze through the eye of a 
needle a proposal to create a new state law that would assure that 
apartments and condominium projects received “ministerial” permits as 
long as the project complied with all local standards, and set aside some 
units for low income residents.115  The Governor’s proposal covered only 
housing projects sized and located to comply with approved city land use 
plans, and as noted above, these plans have already gone through the CEQA 
compliance process.   
The Governor’s “ByRright” proposed permit process—in which an 
applicant was entitled as a matter of law to receive a permit for a housing 
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project that met strict environmental criteria—included low-income 
housing, complied applicable legal standards, and was consistent with the 
approved local land use plan for which CEQA had already been completed.  
It would have sped up housing approvals by avoiding a second round of 
costly and time-consuming CEQA studies, eliminated the potential for a 
second round lawsuit against a project that complied with a plan, and used 
an existing CEQA exemption having to legislatively enact a new CEQA 
exemption or streamlining process.  Avoiding statutory amendments to 
CEQA was a political necessity, since legislators receiving the endorsement 
and campaign funding contributions from the powerful Building Trades 
construction union were required to make a litmus test commitment to 
avoid amending CEQA.  (Building Trades Council members use of CEQA 
lawsuits as leverage for giving their members construction jobs is described 
further in our first report, and below.) 
The Governor’s “By Right” proposal in 2016 died without a single 
Legislator being willing to endorse it—the proposal was never even put in 
print and introduced as legislation.  Opposition by Building Trades to this 
proposal was vociferous,116 and other unions generally remained silent, even 
though union members—who typically earn too much money to qualify for 
“low income” housing and not enough to pay for housing near their jobs, 
especially in the large job markets in the Bay Area and California—would 
have been the major beneficiary of speeding up the approval of new housing 
projects without CEQA lawsuit delays.  Construction workers would get 
work, and the creation of a significant new housing supply in existing 
communities would have helped California catch up with a deficit of more 
than one million new housing units.117   
The political buzzsaw the Governor ran headlong into was the fact that 
only CEQA lawsuits against specific projects which are proposed to be built 
by a specific agency, company or person, create leverage required to avoid or 
settle a CEQA lawsuit in exchange for entering into a private contract 
between the project applicant and the union challenger.  The form of private 
contract is a “Project Labor Agreement,” and requires the project applicant 
to use workers from specific union locals for designated types of work (and 
to make financial contributions to the union’s law firm and central 
leadership to help fund CEQA lawsuits against other projects).118  This use of 
CEQA lawsuits and lawsuit threats is the “workaround” used to avoid 
applicable federal and state laws that prohibit public agencies from 
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requiring applicants to enter into contracts with private entities like unions 
as a condition of receiving agency approval.  The courts have upheld a 
narrower set of laws that allow agencies to require union contracts for 
projects undertaken by the agency itself, and to require “prevailing wages” 
for projects receiving public funds.   
After 2016’s “By Right Fight,” Senator Weiner introduced Senate Bill 35, 
which was quickly dubbed “By Right Light.”  S.B. 35 also required ministerial 
approvals of housing projects that complied with plans (and thus greatly 
irritated “local control” advocates such as the representatives from the cities 
and counties who wanted to retain their authority to approve, downsize, add 
conditions, or deny such projects).119  However, S.B. 35 had the one magic 
ingredient missing from the Governor’s 2016 proposal, which was to require 
housing projects using this “ministerial” approval process to pay “prevailing 
wages” and benefits to construction workers, and use construction workers 
enrolled or trained in apprenticeship programs which are generally run by 
Building Trades for union members.120 While the magnitude of cost increase 
to housing prices caused by paying higher wages and benefits to 
construction workers are disputed,121 at the low side estimate prepared by 
union advocates housing costs increase by 12%,122 in a middle range as 
reported by UC Berkeley’s Program on Housing and Urban Policy concluded 
that prevailing wages added 9% to 37% to construction,123 and a 48% 
construction cost increase was reported by Beacon Economics in a 2016 
study of a prevailing wage ballot initiative enacted in Los Angeles.124  Since 
California’s average home already costs 2.5 times more than the average 
home price nationally, and since the US Census has concluded that high 
housing costs are the reason California has the nation’s highest poverty rate, 
even a 12% increase in housing costs—with no offsetting cost reductions—
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makes the housing built under S.B. 35 less affordable to prospective 
residents.  S.B. 35 was signed into law on September 29, 2017.125 
Use of a putatively color-blind law like CEQA to extract labor 
agreements continues a regrettable history by some unions to seek 
economic advantages for their members at the expense of African Americans 
and other minorities, who along with younger Californians are disparately 
impacted by California’s housing crisis and CEQA’s structural bias in favor of 
the status quo.  As well documented in The Color of Law:  
 
The construction trades continued to exclude African Americans 
during the home and highway construction booms of the postwar 
years, so black workers did not share with whites the substantial 
income gains that blue collar workers realized in the two big 
wage growth periods of the mid-twentieth century—war 
production and subsequent suburbanization.  African Americans 
were neither permitted to live in the new suburbs nor, for the 
most part, to boost their income by participating in suburban 
construction . . . 
 
A 1960’s executive order covering contractors on federally funded 
constructed projects prohibited racial discrimination and 
required affirmative action to recruit African Americans.  Yet 
when a new central post office was authorized for Oakland, 
California (on land cleared by displacing more than 300 families, 
mostly African American), not a single black plumber, operating 
engineering, sheet metal worker, ironworker, electrician or 
steamfittwer was hired for its construction.  When the Bay Area 
Rapid Transit subway system (BART) was built in 1967, not a 
single African American skilled worker was hired to work on it.  
The Office of Federal Contract Compliance blamed the unions, all 
certified by the National Labor Relations Board, for not 
admitting black members.  The BART general manager allow that 
although BART was “committed to equal opportunity,” it was 
unwilling to insist on nondiscrimination because that might 
provoke a work stoppage and “[o]ur prime responsibility to the 
public . . . is to deliver the system . . . as nearly on time as we 
possibly can.”  Although federal regulations provided for 
termination of a contractor for failing to comply with the non-
discrimination order, no penalty was ever imposed.”126  
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C. Impose Nuclear Option of Reversing Project Approvals 
 For Minor Glitches in Thousands of Pages of Technical 
 Report; Allow only Good Buddies to Fix Studies While 
 Building Projects. 
A parade of what our first report calls “Buddy Bills”—limiting CEQA 
lawsuit judicial remedies and speeding up lawsuit schedules for politically 
favored professional sports owners and the Legislature itself—were 
introduced since we completed our first report, and most were approved.  
For example, the Legislature decided that its own office building should not 
be affected by the delays and cost overrun risks that occur with CEQA 
lawsuits, and in an uncodified budget bill gave itself the same remedy 
reform deal as it gave its favorite hometown basketball team in the Kings 
Arena Buddy Bill (S.B. 743) introduced and enacted in the last 72 hours of 
now Mayor (then Senate leader) Darryl Steinberg.  The NBA champion 
Warriors got a deal to expedite the outcome of their CEQA lawsuit, but bills 
to give the same expedited lawsuit deal to an office tower, LA basketball 
arena, and corporate headquarters project remain stalled after the first year 
of this legislative session. 
The Legislature’s willingness to shelter itself and favored political 
cronies from the nuclear option of CEQA’s most common judicial remedy 
has been forcefully and repeatedly criticized by the editorial boards of 
California’s major newspapers, which have demanded the same CEQA 
judicial remedies for the rest of us.127  To allow housing projects to be 
derailed by NIMBY and labor lawsuits, while shielding its own office building 
and sports venues from CEQA lawsuit delays, shines the brightest of lights 
on why the much-publicized Legislative “housing package” of 2017 will do 
little to nothing to get a lot more housing built, and as the Governor noted 
will actually increase housing costs at a time when housing is already 
unaffordable to average California households.128 
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VII. Who’s Responsible for Perpetuating CEQA Litigation Abuse 
 Against Housing? 
Using CEQA lawsuits over and over in the same communities, often for 
nonenvironmental reasons, remains fiercely defended by an alliance of 
NIMBY environmental advocates and building trade union leaders—both of 
which are backbone supporters of the elected legislators in the two-thirds 
majority Democratic Party in the Assembly and Senate.  This coalition has 
created an iron curtain of opposition to reforming CEQA lawsuit rules to get 
more housing produced more quickly in locations that have already gone 
through at least one round of prior CEQA review.  Governor Brown, who 
called CEQA reform “the Lord’s work” when he came into office seven years 
ago—after directly experiencing CEQA delays and cost overruns in his 
efforts to bring 10,000 new housing units to downtown Oakland during his 
two terms as Oakland’s mayor—conceded last year that the politics of CEQA 
reform were extremely difficult “because labor likes to use CEQA lawsuits to 
secure P[project] L[abor] A[greements].”129  PLAs are private deals cut 
between a project sponsor and a particular union local.  For projects and in 
territories where multiple union locals vie for jobs, multiple CEQA lawsuits 
have been filed against the same project.  By threatening or filing and then 
settling a CEQA lawsuit, union locals gain leverage to demand PLAs that 
require that its members get a negotiated set of project jobs.  Even projects 
that are required by law, or agree to pay, the “prevailing wages” established 
by a state agency (which are typically just under three times higher than 
local wages for comparable work), find themselves targeted with CEQA 
lawsuits and lawsuit threats by union locals that demand that jobs go to 
their members – payment of prevailing wages alone is not sufficient.130   
It is no coincidence that the campaign watchdog organization Maplight 
has discovered that construction unions are also the largest single donor to 
Sacramento legislators with campaign contributions in excess of $4 million 
for the most recent years data is available, with the next five highest interest 
groups, including state and local government employees and police and fire 
fighters unions, each falling below $3 million.131 
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Data showing that the vast majority of California’s union workers, who 
make too much money to qualify for subsidized “low income” affordable 
housing, but not enough to rent (let alone buy) a home near where they 
work, suffer most acutely from the housing crisis combination of an acute 
housing supply shortage, extremely high housing costs, and daily commutes 
that for many workers (including construction workers) now extend to three 
hours or more each day (and cause some workers to sleep in pickup trucks 
near job sites away from their families for much of the week). 
Nevertheless, although more than 130 housing bills were introduced 
to address the housing crisis in 2017, as the Los Angeles Times editorial board 
critically noted:  
[L]egislators and Brown are still avoiding some of the most 
controversial, and possibly, effective reforms.  What about changes to 
the California Environmental Quality Act, which is too often used to 
block or shrink infill, transit-adjacent housing developments that are 
exactly the kind of environmentally-friendly projects the state needs?132 
 
Such entreaties, and the housing needs of its members, have not 
moved building trade leadership to reconsider its “transactional” use of 
CEQA lawsuit threats to force PLAs.  Not since the prison guards union was 
the most powerful union in Sacramento—powerful enough to secure CEQA 
exemptions for prisons which then incarcerated generations of young 
people—has a trade union so completely controlled the “environmental” 
priorities that CEQA once protected. 
 
Conclusion: Prayer for Relief 
In August of 2016, I joined more than 100 fellow Democrats on the 
lawn of former State Treasurer Phil Angelides in Sacramento in a fundraiser 
for Hilary Clinton.  Former President Bill Clinton spoke at the event, and 
graciously praised California for its innovation economy, its environmental 
leadership, and its generous funding of Democratic party candidates.  He 
then gave us all a jolt when, with a sharp eye and serious tone, he explained 
that when he was growing up in Arkansas, “everyone knew that if you worked 
hard and played by the rules, you’d do better than your parents.  That wasn’t 
true if you were black, and we needed to work on that.  But it was true for the 
rest of us.” 
Having secured our attention, he went on to explain that for too many 
Americans—including people living not too far away from where we were 
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standing in the Central Valley—that promise that you’d do better than your 
parents if you worked hard and played by the rules hadn’t been true for far 
too long, in some areas, for generations.  He said what we have now in 
America just wasn’t ok, and we needed to all acknowledge—both parties—
that we’d made some mistakes.  “None of us knew,” he said, “what 
globalization was going to mean for American workers, for manufacturers.”  
And now that we do know, “we have to acknowledge the pain, we have to 
work on restoring upward mobility and the American dream, to the huge 
numbers of people in vast areas in the country that are suffering.” 
President Clinton spoke to my heart with that speech, and he spoke to 
my own background as a child of Pittsburg, California, where struggling 
families are still suffering from the shutdown of so many California factories 
in the 1980s and 1990s.  And in that crowd of Hilary supporters, I saw the 
silos, the walls we have created between the haves and have-nots, where 
many in the crowd—including the top ranking environmental regulators in 
the Brown administration—stiffened with resistance to the notion that they 
bore any responsibility for creating or solving the suffering of so many.  
Instead, I saw in the crowd a shudder of rejection—“those people” and 
“those jobs” are at odds with our politically correct policy priorities, which 
are best addressed at tony conferences among the well-dressed and well-
educated where “those people” are tucked away discretely behind kitchen 
doors and valet stations.   
I saw that rejection in CEQA lawsuits across the state that oppose 
housing for “those people,” like the lawyer challenging a Habitat for 
Humanity affordable housing project in downtown Redwood City133 that will 
block part of the view from the single family home he converted to an office 
more than twenty years ago.   
I saw it in the vitriol of opponents of a Planned Parenthood clinic 
relocating to an existing office building, in a CEQA lawsuit134 spanning more 
than three years, based on the city’s failure to evaluate the environmental 
consequences to noise and public safety that the litigants have themselves 
promised to cause if the clinic is allowed to open.  I see it in the three other 
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CEQA lawsuits targeting health care facilities in Kern County,135 San 
Leandro,136 and Willits.137 
I saw the kids that will attend school in trailers, and never experience 
the school improvements built and funded, but stalled by CEQA lawsuits in 
El Cerrito,138 Mill Valley,139 San Mateo,140 Mendocino, Los Angeles,141 and 
Imperial County. 
I saw the kids and grownups sidelined by CEQA lawsuits against parks 
in Salinas,142 San Rafael,143 San Francisco,144 Newport Beach,145 Albany146 and 
Marina Del Rey.147 
I saw patrons of San Francisco’s library,148 the Gene Autrey Museum,149 
and the San Martin Mosque as these projects spend their limited funds on 
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lawyers fussing about the details of traffic studies drag on for years after 
everyone thought their project was “approved.” 
I saw the emergency communication services of Los Angles, Google’s 
internet fiber project, metro projects, bicycle plans, shuttle bus services,150 
tree removals in Beverly Hills151 and tree plantings in Santa Monica,152 and 
sediment removal in a water reservoir, all arrayed in front of a harried 
superior court judge asking—reasonably—what is the environmental 
problem that brings you to my court, and then diving into thousands of 
pages of detailed study for that “gotcha” moment when the judge says, “let’s 
vacate this whole approval and just go back to fix this one thing.” 
And I saw thousands of stalled affordable housing units projects153 
scrambling for funding given the demise of California’s redevelopment tax 
increment laws, apartments next door to new transit stations that cost 
California’s trusting taxpayers billions of dollars to construct, and 
apartments in neighborhoods in virtually every California community with 
struggling strip malls and cleaned up industrial lands, perfectly situated for 
residential use.  
These projects—all included in the stacks of more than 1,000 CEQA 
lawsuits in our offices—don’t get any more “environmental” or “equitable” 
with time.  The housing crisis has gotten worse, the migration of 
Californians to lower cost states with higher per capita GHG has made 
global climate change worse, and the burden of these misbegotten 
government policies once again falls disproportionately harder on people of 
color struggling for a fair shake, not a hand shake and environmental 
platitudes.  The status quo created by CEQA’s litigation rules is morally and 
environmentally unconscionable.  Modest reforms, not “buddy bills” or 
sweeping exemptions, will restore CEQA to its important role in protecting 
the environment and public health.  The housing crisis, and the suffering of 
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too many Californians, are more important than the special interest 
campaign contributor defenders of the status quo. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
